Contextualising. Part 1, Medieval Foot Combat.

To understand anything you need to put it in context. “I’m going to nuke you out of existence” has vastly different meanings when said by a spotty 15 year playing a network computer game and by the U.S. President to whichever “terrorist” nation isn’t towing the line this time. To really understand the systems developed by Liechtenauer and Fiore it is important to know where and how they were used.

So what did the battlefield look like in the late 14th and early 15th Century?
People write a lot of rubbish about medieval battles. This is strange because there are some very good and very easily found books on the topic, however the myths remain.
It is often written that battlefields were agreed upon by the two opposing commanders but this is a gross generalization. They sometimes were, but more frequently one army was defending a geographical feature, such as the ambush at Mortgarten. Other battles occurred when an army sought to relieve a besieged castle such as the battle of Auray. The three best remembered battles of the Hundred Years War were a result of an invading army being caught. At Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt the English sought the most defensible position from which to fight. Frequently battles were fought when two armies bumped each other while marching such as Sempach in 1386.
Obviously this means that some commanders took advantage of natural features when drawing up their troops. Just as obviously medieval armies were disciplined enough to move in formations that allowed easy deployment for battle.
In “The Art of Warfare in Western Europe” Verbruggen quotes a number of source documents all using a similar formula to describe the close ranks used by knights both in foot combat and on horseback. This same formula is used to describe armies on the march. It gives the ideal if not necessarily the reality. What is this formula? The example I’m going to quote is my personal favorite, it isn’t actually in Verbruggen, and I’m not quoting it because it’s actually from the 14th Century, but because it is the most poetic. It was used by Froissart to describe the ranks of dismounted knights at the battle of Auray in 1364. An afternoon truce had been arranged to allow the French forces to cross the river unmolested thereby ensuring a battle would take place. The French army was described by Froissart thus,

“The troops of the Lord Charles were in their best and most handsomest order, and drawn up in the most brilliant manner… …they marched in such close order that one could not throw a tennis ball amongst them.” p66

Such close order was used right through history by armies from all over the world. Why? because

“they were knit so tightly together that their ranks could not be broken.”

The aim of shock tactics, the aim of the charge, was to break the ranks, and the formation. John Keegan puts this very well,

“…accelerating over the last few feet into a run calculated to drive the points of their spears hard on to the enemy’s chests and stomachs. The object would have been to knock over as many of them as possible, and so to open gaps in the ranks and isolate individuals who could then be killed or forced back on to the weapons their own comrades; ‘sowing disorder’ is a short hand description of the aim…”

Similarly in Froissart’s account of the battle of Otterburn we read

“The English rallied and closed up, seeking a position on firm ground and shouting ‘Percy!’ in reply to ‘Douglas!’ of the Scots. A fierce battle began, with prodigious lance-thrusts and men on both sides hurtling to the ground in this first clash.”

Likewise, in one of the few detailed blow by blow accounts of 14th Century battle we read;

“Unto their leaders’ battle-cries loud shouts responsive rose,
Impatient were the sixty all from words to come to blows.
Like bolts into the fray they rush; the shock is fierce and dread;
Yves Charruel is prisoner ta’en, Mellon is stricken dead.
Tristan de Pestivien, that squire of stature high,
By blow from Bélifort’s rude mawle is wounded grievously.
Sore hurt is Rousselot, the brave. And I may not deny
The Bretons have the worst. — Saints, to their succour fly!”

One possible interpretation of this passage is that the damage done to the Bretons was done as part of the charge, as the next verse further develops the battle.
The end of the battle comes when the French are stopped by an English phalanx;

“The Bretons hurl against their foes; but moveless as a rock,
The English phalanx firmly withstands the fury of the shock.”

Until finally one of the French squires mounts his horse and rides through the English formation;
“Then rowel-deep the spurs he plunged into his charger’s flanks,
And wheeling round with lightning speed dashed towards the English ranks.
With the first shock seven doughty foes — yea, seven! — were overturn’d;
And other three he trampled down, as quickly he returned.
By this great stroke De Montauban the English phalanx broke,
Into disorder threw them all, and their high courage shook.
Each Breton knight, as pleased him then, a captive straightway took.
Once the integrity of the English line was broken it was a simple matter for the Bretons to destroy it as a fighting formation. Shock action is not the only way to win a battle though nor does it always work. At Poitiers and Agincourt the forces intending to shock the enemy were simply too closely packed to fight properly, The chroniclers descriptions of these battles makes this clear;
From Froissart describing Poitiers;

“Rarely have skilled fighting men suffered such losses in so short a time as were inflicted on the battalion of the Marshals, for they became jammed against each other and could make no headway.”

So what happens when the charge fails and both armies are willing and able to continue combat? This is when individual combat now takes place up and down the line of combatants. This is where individual fighting skills become important. Again Keegan sums this up,

“…that all infantry actions , even those fought in the closest of close order, are not, in the last resort, combats of mass against mass, but the sum of many combats of individuals – one against one, one against two, three against five. This must be so, for the very simple reason that the weapons which individuals wield are of very limited range and effect, as they remain even since missile weapons have become the universal equipment of the infantryman.”

Individual combat continues until one side breaks. There are a number of reasons why this may happen.
Another charge may take effect. At Sempach the fight between the vanguards of the Swiss and Austrian armies had broken down to individual combat. The main formation of Swiss suddenly appeared on the Austrian flank. The charge of the main body swept the Austrian van away with such momentum that the Swiss carried right through to the Austrian main body and destroyed that also. Having seen the destruction of the forward two formations the third Austrian formation broke and ran.
Geographical features may take effect. At Towton in 1461 the Lancastrian flank was turned and they found themselves fighting with a river at their back. Even worse, the field sloped up from the river. As the Lancastrians were literally fighting uphill, against superior numbers their formation was forced backwards towards the river. Presumably people in the rear of the formation decided that they didn’t want to be caught in the inevitable massacre and began breaking away from the rear. Panic set in, followed by a general rout resulting in one of the bloodiest battles in English history, and the bloodiest on English soil.
Obviously attrition can cause a general collapse or retreat as happened to the Swiss at Jacob en Birs in 1444. In this battle 1500 Swiss forded a river, formed up in their usual 3 “battles” and charged an enemy formation numbering perhaps 40,000. After a 5 hour deadlock the Swiss squares had weakened enough that retreat was inevitable. The Swiss took shelter in a small hospital which was then reduced to rubble by cannon fire. A final assault by the Armagnac foot resulted in bitter hand to hand combat in which every Swiss soldier was killed.
That then is a brief survey of the battlefield for which Fiore and Liechtenauer developed their martial art. Well disciplined, well trained men formed up shoulder to shoulder in tight units, meeting their opponents at the charge. Brave men who ran into a veritable forest of spears before engaging in large scale hand to hand combat with their opponents which continued until one side or the other collapsed.
Why is this important? Try a spear charge. Get 40 of your best mates together in four rows of ten. Have them form up such that you have two ranks at either end of a football field. The front rows hold their spears in pflug, the rear in ochs. Now, staying in step, slowly build up pace until you have a good pace. Don’t forget a war cry.
At the last Australasian Historic Fencing Convention in Canberra I had both my classes run through this exercise. The looks on their faces was worth it. Even done as safely as it was, people reactions were unexpected and surprisingly severe.
Following this exercise, try standing in such a formation and run through your various techniques for armoured combat, try spear vs sword, dagger, dagger vs spear, try some passing footwork, then just to really see how good you are arm people with disparate weapons, form up and go for it. Being in such close proximity to other moving bodies will change the way you fight.

But what does it tell us about the way they fought? Well, firstly they had to face a wide assortment of unmatched weapons and individual techniques. Secondly,they also had to do it within extremely close proximity to others. Thirdly their power of movement would be largely reduced by the nature of formation fighting.

Next, we’ll look at the kinds of challenges faced in judicial duels.

Further reading
Several versions of Froissarts chronicles are commerically available. The quotes from above are all from the Penguin edition translated and edited by John Jollife.

Keegan, J. “The Face of Battle”
Pimlico, London. 1971.

Verbruggen, J.F. “The Art of Warfare in Western Europe in the Middle Ages.
Boydel, Woodbridge. 1997.

The rest of the poem of the Battle of Thirty can be found here.

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